Britain's Poor Track Record on Defence Spending.....
Politicians in Britain love to argue about defence spending, and the debate is usually, and oddly, about what percentage of GDP is the correct level - as if increasing from 2% to 2.5% is a magic bullet to improve defence....
But surely the real question isn’t “How much?”, it’s “How well?” How well does the Ministry of Defence use the money it already gets?
Dominic Lawson summed this up in a recent Sunday Times piece. He pointed out that Britain’s armed forces aren’t on their knees because of a tight budget. The real scandal is the mess: the sheer amount of waste, bungled projects, and poor management.
Take a look at defence procurement. Britain has a track record of turning billion-pound budgets into very little to show for it.
Far too many companies treating the British State like a cash cow....
For example, the Nimrod aircraft project was supposed to deliver 21 new planes. Years of setbacks, technical glitches, and endless redesigns drove costs through the roof, and we ended up spending £3.4 billion before the contract was cancelled, with no planes delivered.
Nice work, if you can get it, terrible deal for the British tax payer...
Then there’s the Ajax armoured vehicle saga. Announced as the future of military reconnaissance, it became another money pit. Delays, technical faults, deafening noise inside, and dangerous vibrations—soldiers complained, but the problems dragged on. The project is years late and still hasn’t met its promises.
Stories like these prompt the obvious question: should we hand the MoD even more money when efficiency is the real issue? Or does increasing the budget just mean bigger, more expensive mistakes ?
Spending and capability don’t always go hand in hand. Different countries spend similar sums but get wildly different results, because what matters is how they buy things, maintain equipment, and train their people. You see it everywhere—putting more cash into an inefficient system doesn’t fix the system; sometimes, it just lets problems grow.
In the world of public policy, this comes down to inputs versus outputs. Politicians love bragging about inputs—the headline budget is simple, clear, and easy to sell. But regular people care about outputs: working kit, well-trained troops, and an armed forces that’s ready for action.
This isn’t just a defence issue either. You see the same pattern with the NHS, schools, transportation—almost anywhere the government spends big. Money helps, up to a point, but you need strong management and actual accountability to get good results.
With talk of rising global threats, there’s lots of pressure to boost defence spending. Fair enough. But taxpayers have every right to ask for proof that current budgets aren’t being squandered.
So the debate needs to shift. Not just “how much?” but “how well?” Unless procurement gets sorted, a larger defence budget may just buy more botched projects and endless delays instead of real security. The challenge isn’t always about finding more money—it’s about fixing how institutions use what they already have.
I think the main problem with government programs is that there is no feedback mechanism to signal success. In a business, profit serves as your metric. From there they can develop KPIs for efficiency and such. Government doesn't generally expect to make a profit, therefore lacks the success metrics to help improve the service or kill it.
An analogy is a company that indefinitely receives venture capital without ever making a profit. In the business world, the funding would eventually stop unless the company can deliver results. In government, there is a continuous supply of revenue. Unproductive activities never get pruned because they never truly face the threat of having their funding stopped. Like the air we breathe, we don't budget our respirations because of the abundance of air. Government isn't measured in their spending because there's always more to tax.
There are so many issues with defence spending that afflict not just the UK, but the west generally. But the business model is the biggest failure. It's "cost plus", meaning that it is in the interests of the manufacturers to make each item as expensive as possible. 30% profit on a million dollar missile that's hand-built is far better than 30% profit on a bunch of £50,000 ones.
They always want to sell "the latest greatest thing", knowing they can inflate the development costs hugely before delivering any actual systems. Then when they've built a few (always about 20% of the number originally quoted for, as penny-pinching ministers balk at the total cost and don't look at the amortised development). Once they've built what the politicians have funded, the production line is scrapped and the skilled workers have to go and find other jobs. Then the whole cycle starts again with the next "latest greatest" over-complex thing.
Compare that with Russia or China, where the private companies are in reality loosely disguised state enterprises. They'll pick a "good enough" system designed for a role, not by international committee. Then they'll set up a production line with a capacity of hundreds of units a month. It'll turn out maybe two or three a month for years, building up a cadre of trained workers. Then, when there is a need, they can spin it up to full production in a couple of months with the skilled workers training the new intake on weapons that are simple enough not to need hand-building. It's a totally different mindset.
Very well explained, I always new our system involves the corporates milking the state for all they can get.