RE: Should The Global Content Reward Pool Be Done Away With?

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That's exactly the problem, that everybody wants to benefit "directly".

That's human nature: the one constant in any system ever built that involves humans. There will always be individuals who act selfishly.

What you do is you design systems that acknowledge human nature and align all incentives as much as possible. A broken system is one that relies on idealism.

Of course stakeholders benefit in the long term if they for example support quality content and thus increase the value of the platform; a network full of quality content attracts new users who start posting, suggest their friends to join, too ... trigger an avalanche ... (cue network effect).
Of course stakeholders benefit if reasonable proposals are supported so that for example great apps can be created.

So long as those goals stand in the way of short-term maximization the system will not work as intended and may even fail completely. This is why you try and disincentivise those short-term strategies that are harmful as much as you can when you design the system parameters.

And again: where did I say there shouldn't be curation rewards anymore?

No, you suggested that going back to 25/75 might be a good idea.



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(Edited)

What you do is you design systems that acknowledge human nature and align all incentives as much as possible. A broken system is one that relies on idealism.

Think about the following fact:

  • Roughly when BTC had it's all time high of about 20000 dollars, STEEM had a value of about 7 dollars (I didn't check the exact dates and values now).

  • NOW BTC has a value of about 11000 dollars, while the price of HIVE/STEEM amounts roughly to 20 dollars, ehm I mean 20 cents. :-)

And during all these years between these two dates greed and aspiration for short term profit reigned the platform. To satisfy the short term greed of many stakeholders (by bid botting, vote selling or granting them high curation rewards) didn't lead to success! So what exactly is broken?

Wouldn't it now be the time to exceptionally try a long term strategy? ... And if then that would have failed, too, you could come back to me with your theory about "broken" systems. :) But for now I claim the system based on short term greed has failed!

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(Edited)

"What you do is you design systems that acknowledge human nature and align all incentives as much as possible. A broken system is one that relies on idealism."

Think about the following fact:

Roughly when BTC had it's all time high of about 20000 dollars, STEEM had a value of about 7 dollars (I didn't check the exact dates and values now).

NOW BTC has a value of about 11000 dollars, while the price of HIVE/STEEM amounts roughly to 20 dollars, ehm I mean 20 cents. :-)

(Just a sidenote: The price of any cryptocurrency is a relatively inaccurate measure of the success or quality of blockchain project it is a native token of. There are hundreds of coins that have very little actual use that still sport high market caps. A good example of that is Dogecoin, which was a joke to begin with.)

And during all these years between these two dates greed and aspiration for short term profit reigned the platform. To satisfy the short term greed of many stakeholders (by bid botting, vote selling or granting them high curation rewards) didn't lead to success! So what exactly is broken?

Incentives prior to the EIP were broken. The EIP fixed the problems to a great extent, but far from completely, when it comes to curation. It was a combination of three elements: the non-linear convergent reward curve, the free downvote pool and the 50/50 split. Those three work in combination. I think going back to the old 75/25 split would make things worse.

It wasn't the purpose of the old system to satisfy anybody's greed and let them exploit the system. The creators of the system, by which I mean the rules coded into the blockchain, did not anticipate the extent to which stakeholders were capable of exploiting them. There was a design error resulting from a lack of experience with systems this. The problems were mitigated to a large extent by the EIP but not completely.

Wouldn't it now be the time to exceptionally try a long term strategy? ... And if then that would have failed, too, you could come back to me with your theory about "broken" systems. :) But for now I claim the system based on short term greed has failed!

Greed and short-term thinking are apply to people. Systems are a separate thing. The old system on Steem wasn't "based" on greed or short-term thinking. It just didn't take those human qualities adequately into account. Its creators didn't anticipate the full consequences of those aspects of human nature. The EIP did a better job.

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The price of any cryptocurrency is a relatively inaccurate measure of the success or quality of blockchain project ...

I am convinced that the STEEM/HIVE price would be higher if the platform was thriving by gaining and retaining new users who would just enjoy being here and recommend the platform to their friends and relatives ...

The EIP ... was a combination of three elements ...

Hey, I am not a newbie, no need for explanation of the EIP. I observed, commented and discussed the whole process these days.
What I suggested above is also a combination of three elements:

  1. Convergent linear curve for author rewards (as we have it now, with the advantages to discourage self-voting and make high author rewards for quality posts possible).

  2. Curation rewards should depend only on the own vote weight (HP, percentage of the vote). That would mean the date of the upvote and the number and strength of the upvotes of other curators wouldn't matter for the own curation rewards, and thus someone who upvotes late and manual (after reading) wasn't disadvantaged compared to someone who just spreads his auto-upvotes. (I don't believe in the myth of the manual curator who finds unknwon 'quality posts' early - and then is followed by the crowd - that may happen sometimes but not often.)

  3. Possible addition: lets go back to 75 % author and 25 % curation rewards, as self-voting would be somewhat more profitable because of a higher curation (but at least no author) rewards (due to #2.).

As I already wrote, I see no reason to reward 'curators' with more than 25 % for doing nothing else than letting a program upvote popular authors as fast as possible!

I think every single point which I am suggesting is worth to be discussed thoroughly.

Actually, most of my ideas don't contradict the aims of the EIP. Only the return to "75/25" would ... but that would help against self-voting as soon as curation rewards only depended on the vote weight.

The old system ... just didn't take those human qualities adequately into account.

Just? That was (and is) exactly the problem!

Concerning the EIP I think it had an overall positive effect but I am by far not as enthusiastic concerning its impacts as you are (and I expressed and explained that in the posts I linked at the beginning of our discussion).

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I am convinced that the STEEM/HIVE price would be higher if the platform was thriving by gaining and retaining new users who would just enjoy being here and recommend the platform to their friends and relatives ...

It's very possible that there would be more speculative buzz if that were the case. Demand for HIVE arising from such organic (non-speculative) demand is extremely far from affecting the price significantly, however. I once did back of the envelope calculation based on revenues per monthly active (MAU) user of mainstream platforms that HIVE (then STEEM) would be worth about 1 cent (if Hive were as good as Twitter at monetizing MAUs, if as bad as Reddit, orders of magnitude less) if all the speculative hot air were taken away.

As I already wrote, I see no reason to reward 'curators' with more than 25 % for doing nothing else than letting a program upvote popular authors as fast as possible!

That's one side of it. Another one is that curation rewards are the one thing what makes powering up worthwhile. Without a high yield, powering up is just shooting yourself in the foot because you lose the ability to sell your coins in case the price spikes, which it is known to do at times. Even if you're a passive investor who just leases their Hive Power, your customers are much more likely to pay well for the delegation if they can expect their curation rewards to be better. If the curation rewards are cut in half, then there will be more vote selling, circle jerking and self-upvoting. Downvotes are so severely underutilized that I

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It's very possible that there would be more speculative buzz if that were the case. Demand for HIVE arising from such organic (non-speculative) demand is extremely far from affecting the price significantly, however.

I disagree: the value of a (social) network is measured among others by the number of its users.
What do you think where the value of facebook comes from - superior technology maybe? :)

If the curation rewards are cut in half, then there will be more vote selling, circle jerking and self-upvoting. Downvotes are so severely underutilized that I [...]

No, we had that already. There is no reason why self-voting should be less lucrative when receiving more curation rewards for the self-votes.
Bid bots/vote sellers can and would be controlled by flags.
Also the @haejin case is a good example which shows that coordinated flagging has a strong impact (especially since there are 'free' flags).

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It's very possible that there would be more speculative buzz if that were the case. >"Demand for HIVE arising from such organic (non-speculative) demand is extremely far from affecting the price significantly, however."

I disagree: the value of a (social) network is measured among others by the number of its users.
What do you think where the value of facebook comes from - superior technology maybe? :)

This is crypto. The valuation of the HIVE token is between 99.9% and 95% speculative according to my quick calculators based on the number of monthly active users and potential earnings per monthly active user. Twitter is able to generate about $9 of earnings per monthly active user PER YEAR. Out of the mainstream platforms, Twitter is the best at generating ad revenue per monthly active user. Facebook makes about $7 per monthly active user per year. Assuming Hive was as good as Twitter at monetizing its user base, the token price would be about 1 cent.

Even if the monthly active user base of about 40,000 of Hive grew a hundredfold, even that wouldn't guarantee the current price absent speculation.

"If the curation rewards are cut in half, then there will be more vote selling, circle jerking and self-upvoting. Downvotes are so severely underutilized that I [...]"

No, we had that already. There is no reason why self-voting should be less lucrative when receiving more curation rewards for the self-votes.

Of course, it is because there is a certain amount of social pressure and risk of getting flagged against self-voting. The 50/50 split caused the balance shift towards less self-voting.

Bid bots/vote sellers can and would be controlled by flags.
Also the @haejin case is a good example which shows that coordinated flagging has a strong impact (especially since there are 'free' flags).

None of those factors alone did it. Many small-time vote farmers saw their gains cut substantially by the non-linear convergent curve.

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(Edited)

This is crypto.

So if HIVE price rises you will all say HIVE is so great, and the EIP does the job, but if it keeps falling that's because of speculation. :)

Of course, it is because there is a certain amount of social pressure and risk of getting flagged against self-voting.

The amount of "social pressure" didn't change with the change of the curation reward percentage.

None of those factors alone did it. Many small-time vote farmers saw their gains cut substantially by the non-linear convergent curve.

As you may have noticed, I am in favour of that curve.
Actually, it's convergent linear (not "non-linear convergent").

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"This is crypto."

So if HIVE price rises you will all say HIVE is so great, and the EIP does the job, but if it keeps falling that's because of speculation. :)

Absolutely not. That's what you seem to be doing.

"Of course, it is because there is a certain amount of social pressure and risk of getting flagged against self-voting."

The pressure didn't change with the change of the curaation reward percentage.

Look, that pressure is a force against vote farming including self-voting, and the potential rewards are a force for vote farming. By weakening the latter, you shift the balance. I won't repeat this again as I'm hoping that I have finally managed to make the point successfully.

"None of those factors alone did it. Many small-time vote farmers saw their gains cut substantially by the non-linear convergent curve."

As you may have noticed, I am in favour of that curve.

Yes. Just saying that the three factors together did it.

This is starting to go in circles somewhat. :)

I would like to thank you for taking trouble of engaging in this exchange!

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That's what you seem to be doing.

Where did I do that? I am observing the STEEM/HIVE price since years, for example compared to the price of BTC, that's completely different than considering short term speculations for my evaluations.

By weakening the latter, you shift the balance.

As I explained, 50 % curation rewards don't reduce the rewards for self-voting (it leads to less author but more curation rewards for the self-voter), and also not of vote farming with own alt accounts. It also doesn't changes the amount of social pressure on self-voters.
But of course you are free to disagree and keep your different opinion.

This is starting to go in circles somewhat. :)

Yes, right, we simply don't agree in some points.

I may write a post about my ideas concerning curation, so that more people are involved and can think about them.

Thanks for the tough discussion. :)

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